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Abstract. Inter-vehicle communication is regarded as one of the major
applications of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In these so called
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) security and privacy are crucial
factors for successful deployment. In a scenario, where each vehicle would
have a unique identifier, eavesdroppers could easily accumulate location
profiles.
As a solution approach, several authors suggest using changeable pseudonyms
as temporary vehicle identifiers. If a vehicle changes its pseudonym from
time to time, long-term tracking can be avoided. However, as we show
in this paper, changing identifiers has detrimental effects on routing ef-
ficiency and increases packet loss.
So, designers of VANET systems need to aim for a balance between
privacy protection on the one and performance on the other hand. The
results of this paper provide advise on how to achieve this balance.
1 Introduction
Vehicular ad hoc networks – often called VANETs – are one of the most promis-
ing application scenarios for mobile ad-hoc networks.
With the advent of car-to-car communication, both passenger safety and
driving comfort can be improved significantly. A car detecting an icy road could
inform follow-up vehicles and thereby prevent accidents. If an accident occurs
anyway, inter-vehicle communication could support emergency relief units to
reach the accident site faster by warning drivers blocking the road ahead or
preemption of traffic lights. Regarding driving comfort, inter-vehicle communi-
cation could serve to exchange traffic flow information for improved navigation
or intelligent adaptive cruise control.
Several research initiatives (e.g. projects like Fleetnet [1] or CarTALK [2]),
both in Europe and the U.S., have already produced results in the investigation
of vehicular ad hoc networks. For instance, geographic routing has been selected
as routing scheme due to its compliance with application needs and its good
performance under extremely dynamic network conditions [3].
Ongoing work is now taking the next steps. One step is the effort to de-
fine common standards among car manufacturers, resulting in initiatives like
the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [4] and the Vehicle Safety
Communication Consortium (VSCC) [5]. Another important step is the research
on security and privacy issues of VANETs, because consumers will definitely not
accept attackable systems in their cars nor the ability to trace their itinerary. In
Europe, the SEVECOM project [6] is specifically dedicated to that.
The importance of privacy is illustrated in Figure 1. Because both geographic
routing as well as many VANET applications make extensive use of position in-
formation, locations of vehicles are constantly exposed on the wireless communi-
cation channel. For instance, several VANET routing and application protocols
use beacon messages that are broadcasted periodically, containing the current
position and perhaps also speed or other vehicle information. While the dissem-
ination of these data usually does not cause any problem when considering only
a single moment, information and place, the combination of several data over
time and at different places can uncover privacy relevant information.
As an example, large petroleum companies may have an interest in detecting
the routes which (potential) customers travel throughout the day. Using this
knowledge, they could plan new petrol stations or adapt prices based on customer
behavior. In order to gather these data, they would simply install C2C-ready
communication devices at their petrol stations1 and collect the beacons sent
out by all cars that carry VANET equipment. Using information gathered from
electronic payment at petrol stations, these companies might even link cars to
individual persons and start targeted advertisement for specific customer groups.
Whereas this scenario may have only a modest impact on the privacy of
each individual2, other scenarios with a more severe background seem far more
threatening. Government agencies could easily control where people go with their
cars in a much more complete and reliable fashion as it is possible with video
surveillance and automatic image recognition. Likewise, private investigators
could track and trace cars easily through the cities by following the cars in 100
meters distance which is equivalent to placing a radio beacon on the car.
One has to consider, that these location profiles may be accumulated over
years and that you might become a suspect of a crime, just because your car
was detected near a crime scene three months ago. This may also allow behavior
profiles, e.g. your boss may be interested in the fact that you visit the hospital
twice a month.
Previous work such as [7,8,9,10] suggests the use of randomly changing iden-
tifiers – so called pseudonyms – to prevent this kind of privacy intrusions. While
it is still possible to collect data, associating it with identities over time gets
much more complicated if node identifiers are used only for a short period of
time.
However, when changing pseudonyms a number of new problems arise:
1 depicted as circles in the figure
2 but it may have an influence on gas prices we have to pay
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Fig. 1. Passive eavesdropper records beacons and/or application messages at
important places and vehicle A tracks way of vehicle B
– Traceability due to context
A vehicle may be tracked despite of regular pseudonym changes because of
certain circumstances. For instance, if the car changes its pseudonym while
very few other vehicles are around, linking old and new pseudonym is rather
simple by tracing its trajectory using beacons [7]. Similarly, if a car uses
changing pseudonyms daily and is parked on the same reserved parking slot
each day, the pseudonyms can also be related easily.
– Traceability due to cross-layer influence
Changing the pseudonym on one communication layer does not make sense
if protocols on other, non-encrypted layers also use identifiers. In this case,
node pseudonyms could be linked by the identifiers of other communication
layers. So, changing pseudonyms must be coordinated between layers.
– Security implications
Anonymity has also drawbacks. Many security schemes that want to protect
MANETs from selfish or malicious nodes propose mechanisms where these
misbehaving nodes are first detected and then excluded from the network.
With pseudonyms, misbehaving nodes can evade this exclusion by simply
creating a new identity. Preventing this is a hard problem.
– Problems with application protocols
There are applications that need a long-term communication relationship
between the involved parties. Examples include any type of file-transfer or
interactive chat-sessions. Often, these protocols have an explicit session layer
which controls authentication, association, stream control and similar issues.
When identifiers change, it can become very complex and expensive to re-
establish the session, as partners need to be re-authenticated3, some data
may need to be replayed, etc.
3 see [11] for a potential solution
– Impact on communication protocols
In most communication protocols, identifiers play a vital role. For example,
beaconing is an important service for geographic routing as well as some
applications that deal with context-awareness in VANETs. While high fre-
quency of changing pseudonyms improves privacy, it also complicates the
design of communications protocols.
In this paper, we focus on the last aspect. Because geographic routing relies
on stable identifiers of neighboring nodes, frequent pseudonym changes disturb
proper routing functionality.
Changing the pseudonym once a day may be enough to prevent long-time
tracking, but will not prevent an private investigator from following a car through-
out the day. There are also applications where the car is needed to identify itself
or to its communication partner, e.g. when you do electronic payment of tolls
and the money is collected using bank transfers. Once this has happened, your
movement profile for the whole day can be directly linked to your identity.
On the other hand changing the pseudonym only once every night while
the car is parked at home in the garage has surely no significant influence on
communication performance or on-going sessions.
On the other hand, changing the pseudonym every 10 milliseconds might
increase privacy protection but will surely render most communication useless,
as no node will be able to send you a packet as a reply to a previous packet you
send earlier.
This paper analyzes the effects of privacy-enhancement mechanisms on the
functionality of position-based routing protocols that forward packets hop-by-
hop to the destination. In contrast to topology-based protocols, position-based
routing is well suited to the specific characteristics of VANET scenarios [3], e.g.
in terms of node mobility and application needs. From a privacy point of view,
these protocols have the drawback that they link the position and identity of a
node in every beacon message they send.
With our results, we aim at supporting the design of VANET systems that
balance between privacy and operative requirements like performance or session
stability. In our further analysis, we focus on the performance implications of
pseudonym changes. In Section 2, we first describe a theoretical analysis of po-
tential causes for packet loss and expected effects on routing. Later in Section 3,
we support these findings by means of simulations. Before we finally summarize
and conclude our results in Section 5, we give a short overview on related work
in Section 4.
2 Effects of Pseudonym Changes on Geographic Routing
2.1 Routing approach
We have based our analysis on the Cached Greedy Geocast (CGGC) routing pro-
tocol [12] which has been developed as part of the Fleetnet project. With CGGC,
nodes periodically announce their identifier and current location using beacon
messages. Nodes broadcast beacons every b seconds to all neighbors within re-
ception range. Based on the information contained in beacons, nodes build up
neighbor tables. Table entries expire after to seconds and are removed from the
table afterward.
If a node m generates a packet or receives one for forwarding, it searches its
neighbor table for the node which is located closest to the destination:
min(d(n, dest)) ∀n ∈ NT
where NT stands for neighbor table, dest is the node identifier of the destination
node, n is a node entry in the neighbor table, and d(n, dest) is the Euclidean
distance between n and dest.
If no such node is available (i.e. all d(n, dest) >= d(m, dest) with m being
the own node identifier), then the node simply stores the packet in a packet
cache until a suitable neighbor becomes available due to node movement.
2.2 Analysis of effects
For the analysis, we make the basic assumptions that beacons and data packets
are sent at fixed intervals, but without any synchronization between each other.
Likewise, nodes change pseudonyms at a fixed rate which is also not synchronized
to the other intervals.
Data packets and beacons are sent as simple datagrams, there are no higher
layer retransmission mechanisms (e.g. TCP) in place. This is a reasonable as-
sumption, as most multi-hop applications which disseminate messages in VANETs
work this way.
Let b be the beacon interval in seconds (e.g. 1s), p be the packet interval
(e.g. 2s), and c be the pseudonym change interval (e.g. 10s).
For simplicity, we further assume c > to, i.e. there is at most one pseudonym
change per beacon timeout interval. Changing pseudonyms more frequently is
usually not reasonable. Further, we assume that b ≤ p, because many VANET
applications send simple information or warning messages at rather long inter-
vals, so this assumption seems reasonable. However, we will also shortly discuss
the b > p case at the end.
Figure 2 shows an excerpt from a VANET scenario. Node m has created
or received a packet for forwarding which is destined for node o. n is the the
neighbor node with the smallest Euclidean distance to o and would be selected
as next hop. n periodically broadcasts beacons with its identity and position
which m uses to update its position table. But what happens when n changes
its identity to n′?
m still has n in its neighbor table and might send packets to n for forwarding.
n′ will however ignore these packets, because otherwise packets sent to n would
be resent by n′ so both identities could easily be correlated. Therefore such
packets will get lost.
We are now interested in the percentage of packets that may get lost due to a
pseudonym change in contrast to a similar scenario without pseudonym change.
Figure 5 shows the potential cases and the respective probabilities.
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Multiplying the probabilities for each path that leads from the root to a leaf
where packets are lost and adding up the results gives us the overall probability
of packet loss or in other words the expected percentage of packets that will be
lost due to pseudonym changes. The result is that to2c of all packets will get lost.
We now explain the probability tree in detail from top to bottom.
Is a packet affected by pseudonym change? Looking at Figure 3, we see that
only packets that follow a pseudonym change (PC) can be affected by this PC.
One to interval after the last beacon with the old pseudonym (b) has been sent,
this information will be removed from the neighbor table and only information
from beacons containing the new pseudonym (b′) will be available to node m. As
the last beacon (b) was sent on average b/2 before the pseudonym change and
as the to interval starts from this point on, the average timeframe for affected
packets is to − b2 . Considering the whole time between two pseudonym changes,
to− b2
c of all packets will be affected on average. The other 1−
to− b2
c packets will
be delivered regularly.
Is a packet the first packet after PC? For the first packet after each pseudonym
change, there are two alternatives: either the packet p is sent before the next
beacon b′ or is is sent after the next beacon b′. In the first case, there is no
information available on the new pseudonym n′ and the packet will be definitely
lost. In the second case, the fate of the packet depends on the node movements,
as we will see in the next step.
In Figure 4, we explain how to calculate the probability of first receiving a
packet before a beacon. We still assume b ≤ p. Depending on the parameters
b and p, there is a varying amount of ”complete” beacon intervals within each
packet interval, on average
⌊
p
b
⌋
. When the pseudonym change happens inside
one of these intervals, we will definitely receive another beacon before the next
packet.
The ”rest” in front and at the end of the packet interval has a varying length
which depends on the offset of b at the beginning of the p interval. Depending
on this offset, this ”rest” ranges between zero and two beacon intervals. On
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Fig. 5. Loss probability tree
average, it will be one beacon interval, as the packet sent always divides one
interval which then contributes to the ”rest” of the previous and next packet
interval.
The relative amount of time of one beacon interval compared to one packet
interval is bp . On average, half of this time is located at the beginning of the
packet interval and half of the time at the end. Only when the pseudonym change
happens in the part the end of a packet interval, the packet is sent without a
preceding beacon and the packet is lost (see Figure 4). The probability of loosing
a packet because of this reason is therefore b2p .
Has n moved closer to o while changing pseudonyms? For all packets that are
affected by a pseudonym change and that are sent after a beacon with the new
pseudonym (b′) has been received, the following situation applies: the sending
node has both information on n and n′ in the neighbor table. As the sending
node m cannot link n and n′, it will simply select the forwarding node based on
its routing metric, i.e. the node which is closer to the destination o. Let d(n, o)
be the Euclidean distance between n and o. We assume that node n can move
in the radius r within one beacon time as shown in Figure 2.
The last beacon before pseudonym change reported position pn, the next
beacon after pseudonym change reports position pn′). As m cannot correlate n
and n′, it assumes that there is an known node at position pn and another node
at position pn′ . If d(n′, o) < d(n, o), the new node will be preferred, otherwise
m will try to send its packets to the previously known node.
If d(n′, o) < d(n, o), the packet will be received and forwarded, if d(n′, o) >
d(n, o) the packet will not be received and gets lost. If d(n′, o) = d(n, o), m
randomly selects one of the two nodes, which gives a 50% chance of success or
loss.
If o is far away (d(n, o) >> 1), the circle around n with radius r is divided
in two halves, where all positions on the left are further away from o and all
positions on the right are closer to o. Assuming random node movement of n,
the chance of packet loss because of movement is therefore estimated to be 12 .
One might object that node n might even move to a position outside of
transmission range of m and packets will then be lost with 100% probability.
As this case can however occur with or without pseudonym change and packets
sent to n are not received at the new position pn′ anyway, the packet is lost,
no matter if there is a pseudonym change or not. Since we are only interested
in additional packet loss due to pseudonym change, this case will be neglected
here.
Of course, movements of other nodes in the neighborhood of m might also
change the potential forwarding node. This effect is also not considered here as
it also happens independent of pseudonym change at the same rate.
If we now go back to the probability tree in Figure 5 we need to add the
multiplied probabilities of all paths leading to a leaf node where packets get
lost:
Ploss =
to − b2
c
p
to − b2
b
2p
+
to − b2
c
p
to − b2
(1− b
2p
)
1
2
+
to − b2
c
(1− p
to − b2
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2
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2c
What is interesting to see is that the loss probability is independent of the
packet send rate and the beacon rate, but instead depends only on the relation
between neighbor cache timeout and pseudonym change rate.
This result is valid only for our assumptions where b ≤ p ≤ to ≤ c. Using a
similar reasoning we can also show that for b ≥ p, the loss probability is
Ploss =
b2 − c2 + 4bp+ 2tob
4bc
As you can see, in this case the situation gets more complex and all four
parameters influence the loss probability.
In the next section, we will now present the results of simulations that analyze
the effects of pseudonym changes on the packet delivery rate.
3 Simulation results
The analysis in the previous section clearly points out which effects may occur
when pseudonyms are changed. To estimate the order of magnitude of these
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 100
Length of square node field 1000 – 4000m
Max. node velocity 10 – 50 m/s
Pause times 0.0 s
Mobility model Random Waypoint
Link-/MAC layer IEEE 802.11b
Wireless transmission range 250 m
Number of sent messages 500
Pseudonym change interval p 5 – 60 s
Simulation time 120 s
Simulation runs 20
Beacon interval b 1 s
Neighbor cache timeout to 6 s
Table 1. Short overview on simulation parameters
effects on geographic routing, we conducted simulations with the network simu-
lator ns-2, version 2.29 [13].
In these simulations, nodes are equipped with the previously described greedy-
based geographic routing layer. Besides, every node changes its pseudonym with
a defined frequency that is randomly jittered within ± 5 seconds. After having
changed its pseudonym, just packets addressed to the node’s new identifier are
accepted. Pseudonym change and beaconing intervals are completely indepen-
dent, which means that there is no extra beacon after the pseudonym change.
Both settings help keeping privacy - accepting packets for the old addresses or
sending a beacon immediately after the pseudonym change would cut location
privacy to some extent.
As data traffic, messages are generated and sent from randomly selected
source nodes to random destinations using the described geographic routing
protocol. This leads to larger distances between sender and destination when the
network field size is increased. Moreover, packets are sent as geo-anycast, which
assures that a destination is reachable regardless of changing identifiers. Detailed
simulation settings like network topology, node mobility and composition are
summarized in Table 1.
3.1 Basic impact of pseudonym changes
A straight-forward measurement to quantify influences on routing is given by
the number of packets that reach their destination. This delivery ratio directly
reflects the performance of the routing protocol. Figure 6 shows the decrease in
delivery ratio that is caused by pseudonym changes in relation to routing with
stable identifiers, which is marked in the graph by the value ∞ as pseudonym
change interval . Main insights of Figure 6 are on the one hand that delivery
performance almost reaches the level without any identifier change when the
interval is 60 seconds. On the other hand, a change interval of about five seconds
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without pseudonym changes
seriously decreases delivery ratio. For instance, in the network with 2000m ×
2000m field size, geographic routing usually delivers over 60% of all messages,
whereas only little more than 20% reach their destination when nodes change
their identifieres every five seconds.
3.2 Influence of node density
Another observation from Figure 6 is the fact that networks with higher node
density (like 1000m× 1000m) can cope better with pseudonym changes. In this
configuration, the additional packet loss is less than 30%, but over 40% in case
of the 2000m × 2000m sized field. Figure 7 gives a more detailed insight of the
influence of node density. It shows the relation between successfully delivered
packets when using changing pseudonyms in contrast to permanent identifiers.
As we can see, even with a pseudonym change frequency of 30s, packet delivery
ratio may decrease almost 20%. The fact that there is a peak decrease at about
2000m to 2500m field side lengths is due to decrease of delivery ratio without
changing identifiers when node density gets low (∼ 20% at 3000m× 3000m, see
also Figure 6). Therefore, only packets with short trip reach their destination
in low-density networks anyway and thus are also likely to face no pseudonym
change, too.
Regarding privacy, changing the pseudonym only every 30 seconds may per-
haps be a too long time already. Though such a change interval surely avoids
being tracked in a global scope, an attacker following another vehicle may be
able to figure out into which direction the haunted vehicle has turned off at
an intersection. On the other hand, re-identifying the tracked car after it has
actually changed its pseudonym could be a difficult task for the attacker if the
pseudonym change is done carefully.
3.3 Influence of node velocity
Node velocity is a crucial parameter in VANETs. Geographic routing has shown
to cope well with this requirement [14]. As depicted in Figure 8, when using
pseudonyms, delivery success ratio does not decrease much with higher node
velocity. Interestingly, this contrasts to the decrease of successfully delivered
packets when routing can rely on stable node identifiers. Particularly in the sce-
nario with lower node density (2000m×2000m), delivery ratio decreases notably
from 60% to 30%, whereas the difference with 10s pseudonym change interval is
only about 10% between 10m/s and 50m/s maximum node velocity. Hence, the
effect of changing pseudonyms decreases with higher node velocities.
3.4 Comparison with theoretical analysis
The loss probability of to2c that we found in the analysis in section 2 is independent
of beacon and packet intervals. As this is a result that one might not expect, we
explicitly verified it in our simulations. Figure 9 shows the packet delivery ratio
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with different values for p, c, b and to. Though single result values differ about
5%, at large, the graph confirms that b and p are not relevant for loss probability.
Besides, also the order of magnitude of losses coheres with the analytical result.
Taking a look at Figure 7, we see that the loss due to pseudonym change
corresponds to on average 50% with c = 5s, 30% with c = 10s, and 5 − 10%
with c = 30s. Table 2 compares this to the expected results using our formula
Ploss = to2c .
As a summary, we can conclude that we have a good correspondence of
simulation findings and analytical results which both support our claim that
pseudonym changes can lead to a significant reduction in routing performance
under certain circumstances. It is interesting to see that the packet and beacon
rates do not influence this loss.
3.5 Improvement with MAC/LL callback
The basic reason why packets get lost is because they starve out in link layer
interface queues due to neighbors that are no more available. Therefore, applying
a direct callback mechanism from link layer to routing layer is likely a method
to overcome the problem of outdated neighbor table entries due to pseudonym
change. In an enhancement of our simulation implementation, we tested this
mechanism in conjunction with pseudonym changes. Thus, the link layer in-
forms the geographic routing about unreachable neighbors immediately after a
transmission failed and passes back the packet. The routing then takes up the
packet again, determines the next hop the packet was originally sent to and re-
c Simulation Analytical
5s ≈ 50% Ploss = 5s2∗5s = 50%
10 ≈ 30% Ploss = 5s2∗10s = 25%
30 ≈ 5− 10% Ploss = 5s2∗30s = 8, 3%
Table 2. Comparison of analytical results with simulation findings
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Fig. 10. Aggregated number of lost link notifications
moves it from its neighbor table. After the update, the packet is re-enqueued for
routing.
Figure 10 depicts the aggregated number of MAC callbacks that occurred
during simulations. In consistence with the previous results, most link failures
occur in mid-sized networks. More importantly, the simulation results also show
that the MAC callback mechanism is able to reduce the performance decrease
almost to zero even with pseudonym change frequency of 5s.
Unfortunately in reality, wireless links usually are rather unstable. Thus,
if a node removes a neighbor immediately after a single transmission failed,
links to neighboring nodes may be removed though they are only temporarily
unavailable. To meet this problem, direct MAC callback has to be used carefully,
e.g. only after a set of retries.
4 Related work
With progressing research on VANETs, the quest for privacy has emerged as a
crucial factor. Several authors, for instance Hubaux et al. [15] or Do¨tzer in [8],
addressed that topic. They argue, that cars are personal devices that are usually
kept for a rather long time and even innocent looking data may become privacy-
relevant when evaluated over a longer period of time. Therefore, they propose to
use changing pseudonyms as temporary identifiers to preserve privacy. In [15],
Hubaux et al. also review entropy as a metric to quantify the effectiveness of
pseudonym changes. In [16], Sampigethaya et al. take up the idea of selecting
certain nodes as mix nodes. All nodes that belong to one cluster communicate
only through their mix node and thus manage to stay private.
On the other hand, [8] also states that vehicles are expected to work reliably,
implying that applications of inter-vehicle communication have to face this re-
quirement as well. Unfortunately, from the point of view of security, detection
and exclusion of malicious nodes usually relies on the ability to identify nodes.
Thus, there is a clear tradeoff between security and privacy. For example, as
Golle et. al stated in [7], higher pseudonym change frequency leads to smaller
margins for detection and correction of malicious behavior.
The proposed solution to the problem in [8] is to deploy a trusted third
party, that issues a limited number of pseudonyms per vehicle and records the
corresponding, real identity. In case of problems, the issuer can withdraw the
pseudonyms and disclose the real identity if necessary.
Further work was done in the field of location privacy in pervasive comput-
ing. In [17], Beresford and Stajano propose so-called mix-zones to overcome the
linkability problem when nodes change pseudonyms arbitrarily. Schlott et al. in-
vestigate attacks on random pseudonym change schemes using some side channel
information in [18].
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we focused on the effects of pseudonym changes on the performance
of geographic routing that is intended to be used in VANETs. The analysis shows,
where pseudonym changes affect routing procedures and result in packet losses.
Both analytical results and simulation confirm serious performance decreases in
case of less dense network connectivity and high pseudonym change intervals (
< 30s).
We suggest introducing a callback mechanism which informs the routing
about failed transmissions. The routing can then cope better with pseudonym
changes. On the other hand, such a callback mechanism needs to be implemented
carefully because links are rather unstable in highly dynamic ad hoc networks
like VANETs.
In conclusion, our work shows that operational and privacy requirements
need to be balanced in VANETs. This can be achieved by choosing appropriate
pseudonym change intervals and implementing a ”soft” callback from link layer,
for instance if a transmission failed several times.
Currently, both simulation and analysis focus on the case where beacons are
sent more often than data packets (b < p) because we estimate this to be very
important for many eSafety applications. We are now about to also investigate
the opposite case with b > p.
These results will help us to develop a privacy protection mechanism for
VANETs, which is one of the objectives of the SEVECOM project.
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